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Abstract
Many optimization methods for generating black-box ad-
versarial examples have been proposed, but the aspect of
initializing said optimizers has not been considered in much
detail. We show that the choice of starting points is indeed
crucial, and that the performance of state-of-the-art attacks
depends on it. First, we discuss desirable properties of
starting points for attacking image classifiers, and how they
can be chosen to increase query efficiency. Notably, we find
that simply copying small patches from other images is a
valid strategy. In an evaluation on ImageNet, we show that
this initialization reduces the number of queries required
for a state-of-the-art Boundary Attack by 81%, significantly
outperforming previous results reported for targeted black-
box adversarial examples.
1. Introduction
Black-box adversarial attacks describe a scenario in
which an attacker has access only to the input and output of
a machine learning model, but no specific knowledge about
its parameters or architecture [11]. Intuitively, it may seem
improbable for an attacker to simply guess the vulnerabili-
ties of a model, but recent work has demonstrated that it is
indeed possible to create custom-tailored adversarial exam-
ples for any black box when allowed to query the model a
large number of times [1, 8, 9, 15, 5].
Naturally, the practicality of such attacks depends on the
number of queries required and much work has gone into
designing efficient optimization strategies. Gradient estima-
tion techniques have been popular [8, 5, 15] for models that
provide real-valued output (e.g. softmax activations), and
sophisticated sampling strategies have been proposed that
drastically reduce the number of iterations [9]. The same
has happened in the much harder label-only setting, where
models only output a single discrete value (e.g. the top-1
class label). Early success in this setting was sparked by the
Boundary Attack [1], which essentially performs a random
Original: Ford Model T Original: Wombat
Starting point: Tibetan mastiff Starting point: Garter snake
d`2 = 36.22 d`2 = 17.01
Adv. example: Tibetan mastiff Adv. example: Garter snake
d`2 = 9.04 d`2 = 1.47
Figure 1. Starting points for adversarial attacks, synthesized by our
method. (Top) Original images. (Middle) Starting points obtained
by inserting small patches from images of the target class. (Bot-
tom) Adversarial examples obtained after refining the images with
a targeted black-box attack. Less than 1000 model queries are
needed to render the perturbation virtually imperceptible, while
the adversarial label is retained.
walk along the decision boundary, and several variants have
been proposed that improve the efficiency of this search pro-
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cedure [7, 4]. Another family of successful black-box at-
tacks exploits the fact that machine learning models often
share vulnerabilities. They train surrogate models, perform
white-box attacks and find adversarial examples that can be
transferred to the model under attack [10, 14, 11].
It is evident that considerable effort has gone into the de-
sign of sophisticated optimization procedures. Yet surpris-
ingly, the question of how to initialize them has not been
discussed in detail. We consider this to be a rather impor-
tant gap in current literature, since costly optimization pro-
cedures can often be sped up by a smart choice of starting
points. Our contribution is as follows:
• We discuss beneficial properties of starting points and
how they can improve the efficiency of iterative black-
box attacks.
• As a proof of concept, we propose a simple copy-and-
paste scheme, in which patches from images of the ad-
versarial class are added to the image under attack.
• We use this strategy to initialize a state-of-the-art at-
tack and evaluate it against an ImageNet classifier. Our
initialization reduces the number of queries by 81%
when compared with previous results, and thus forms
a new state of the art in query-efficient black-box at-
tacks. The source code for repeating our experiment is
publicly available 1.
In this work, we exclusively focus on the targeted label-
only black-box setting, where an attacker must change the
classification to a specific label and does not have access to
gradients or confidence scores. This is one of the hardest
settings currently considered [1, 4, 6, 8] and therefore our
results should be valid for easier settings as well.
2. Initialization strategies
Currently, black-box adversarial attacks start with either
(a) the original image or (b) an example of the target class.
In the case of (a), the attack tries to take steps into direc-
tions that lead to an adversarial region. This is considered
very hard and is typically approached by estimating gradi-
ents [8, 5] or transferring them from a surrogate [10]. This
approach can be unreliable and many queries must be spent
before the adversarial region is found [4]. In order to im-
prove reliability, other attacks [1, 8, 4] employ (b), where
the starting point already has the desired class label but the
distance to the original image is high. As a result, the attack
needs to travel a great distance through the input space, re-
quiring many steps until it arrives at an example that is rea-
sonably close to the original.
1 https://github.com/ttbrunner/blackbox_
starting_points
Both strategies have potential for improvement. For (a),
Trame`r et al. [14] propose adding small random pertur-
bations to the input, which they find to increase the over-
all success rate. In this work, we focus on (b) – recent
black-box attacks have achieved impressive results using
this method [4, 8], and at the same time it seems very easy
to improve. Surely some images of the target class would be
better suited than others, and the number of required queries
could be reduced by choosing them in a systematic manner.
2.1. Criteria for suitable starting points
In image classification, an adversarial example is con-
sidered successful if has low distance to the original image
(e.g. measured by some norm of the perturbation) and is at
the same time classified as an adversarial label. We assume
two properties to be beneficial for attack efficiency:
Starting points should be close. Intuitively, it makes
sense to pick points that are already close to that goal. The
optimization procedure would then merely refine them, re-
quiring less iterations to arrive at an adversarial example or
produce a better one in the same number of steps. The most
straightforward approach is to search a large data set (e.g.
ImageNet) for images of the target class and then pick the
one with the lowest distance to the original.
Starting points should reduce dimensionality. Opti-
mization often suffers from very large search spaces. An
ImageNet example at a resolution of 299 x 299 has 268,203
dimensions. It is therefore desirable to reduce this search
space and to concentrate only on specific dimensions. No-
tably, Brunner et al. [4] demonstrate that attacks gain effi-
ciency by concentrating only on pixels that differ between
the current image and the original, ignoring the rest. A
suitable starting point should facilitate this, ideally by not
replacing the original entirely but only small regions of it.
The attack can then be limited to these regions.
3. Copy-pasting adversarial features
In order to test our assumptions, we propose a simple
strategy that segments images of the target class into small
patches and then inserts them into the image under attack.
It is geared towards attacks targeting the `2 norm, but simi-
lar strategies could be applied to improve `∞ attacks. This
work should be understood as a proof of concept that offers
many opportunities for refinement. Nevertheless, our eval-
uation in Section 4 shows that this simple approach already
delivers a large boost in efficiency.
3.1. Segmentation by saliency
The most important pixels for classification are those that
contain salient features. They typically concentrate in small
regions (e.g. nose and eyes of an animal, see Figure 2),
whereas the rest of an image matters little for the predicted
class label. The unimportant regions can safely be removed
SUCCESS RATE VS NUMBER OF QUERIES MEDIAN QUERIES
# ATTACK INITIALIZATION 500 1000 2500 5000 10000 15000 UNTIL SUCCESS
1 BBA [4] CLOSEST IMAGE 0.04 0.09 0.25 0.46 0.72 0.80 5485
2 BBA [4] COPY AND PASTE (OURS) 0.29 0.38 0.63 0.75 0.88 0.90 1541
3 BBA (TUNED) COPY AND PASTE (OURS) 0.32 0.49 0.74 0.86 0.94 0.96 1028
Table 1. Comparison of initialization strategies for a targeted label-only Boundary Attack on ImageNet. All numbers include queries made
during initialization. Run 1 is the biased Boundary Attack (BBA) as implemented by Brunner et al. [4]. Run 2 replaces their starting points
with ours, but otherwise performs the same attack. In run 3, we tune some of the attack hyperparameters to take better advantage of our
starting points, resulting in an even larger performance gain.
– compare the starting points in Figure 3 (left), where re-
moving the background significantly lowers the `2-distance
to the original but retains the adversarial label. To do this,
we can apply any segmentation method of our choice. In
our implementation, we use a surrogate model to construct
saliency maps for images of the target class and then blend
these pixels into the original image.
Saliency maps are model-specific, and therefore our ini-
tialization could be interpreted as a transfer attack that is
not guaranteed to generalize across models. To address this
concern, we apply heavy smoothing and amplification to
the map. This results in contiguous patches that cover the
salient regions and are therefore likely to contain the core
motif of an image (see Figure 2). We expect this method to
generalize well across models, but in practice it can also be
replaced by any other segmentation technique available to
the attacker.
3.2. Placing adversarial patches
It is apparent that the inserted pixels constitute small ad-
versarial patches that change the classification of an entire
image. This effect has been described by Brown et al. [3],
who construct small patches that are very salient but also
strikingly visible to human observers. It would be possible
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 2. Segmentation of starting points. (a) An image of the
target class, label ”lion”. (b) Saliency mask on a surrogate. (c)
Smoothened and amplified mask to improve reliability. (d) Orig-
inal image under attack, label ”water bottle”. (e) Starting point
after the patch is inserted. (f) Final adversarial example.
to use their patches as starting points, however their strong
visibility is contrary to our goals – attacks in our setting aim
to reduce the perturbation as much as possible in an attempt
make the patches completely imperceptible to humans.
We use a simple brute-force method for placement.
Salient patches are extracted from multiple images of the
target class, randomly scaled and translated, and then
blended over the original image. We create 50 such candi-
dates and rank them by distance to the original image. The
candidates are then tested against the black box and the first
image to be adversarially classified is chosen as the final
starting point.
We typically find success within the first 10 candidates,
but in the case that all are unsuccessful on the black-box
model, an attacker may wish to fine-tune the procedure, in-
crease patch size or fall back to full-sized images. In our
evaluation, we are able to synthesize valid starting points
for all examples.
4. Evaluation
To demonstrate the speedup provided by our initializa-
tion method, we apply it to a black-box attack against a pre-
trained Inception-v3 ImageNet classifier [13].
Setting. We choose a query-limited targeted label-only
setting, which is currently considered to be one of the most
difficult scenarios [1] to attack. We do not consider untar-
geted attacks, as ImageNet contains 1000 classes: An at-
tacker could simply substitute one dog breed for another
and thus create an ”adversarial” example.
Data set. We randomly pick 1000 images from the Ima-
geNet validation set and resize them to 299 x 299 x 3. For
each image, we pick a random class label as the adversar-
ial target. Our initialization method chooses images of the
target class from the ImageNet validation set and uses a pre-
trained Inception-ResNet [12] to extract salient regions.
Attack method. We perform a Boundary Attack [1],
which is one of the simplest `2 attacks and at the same
time has recently been shown to be one of the most query-
efficient [2, 4] in our setting. We use the publicly avail-
able implementation of Brunner et al. [4], who perform bi-
ased sampling to obtain state-of-the-art performance. We
replace their initialization (closest image of the target class)
i = 1 i = 500 i = 1000 i = 2500 i = 5000 i = 10000
d`2 = 152.68 d`2 = 55.30 d`2 = 52.86 d`2 = 41.38 d`2 = 29.27 d`2 = 22.37
d`2 = 29.51 d`2 = 14.84 d`2 = 11.62 d`2 = 7.93 d`2 = 6.19 d`2 = 5.50
Figure 3. Number of queries vs. perturbation magnitude for a Boundary Attack. (Top) Initialized with a full-sized image of the target class.
(Bottom) Initialized with our method. All images are classified as the adversarial label, ”lion”.
with our own and activate their low-frequency and regional
masking biases. Low-frequency perturbations have been
shown to improve efficiency [7, 9], and the masking bias
should be able to take full advantage of a low-dimensional
search space. For the sake of simplicity we deactivate the
surrogate bias, and use our surrogate model only for extract-
ing the (smoothened) saliency maps.
Success criteria. We measure attack efficiency in num-
ber of queries until success. We define success as d`2 <
25.89, which is the same threshold as used in the original
attack [4]. This number roughly corresponds to a worst-
case `∞ perturbation of 0.05 in our resolution, which is a
threshold also used by other black-box attacks on ImageNet
[8, 9].
Results. Table 1 shows that our synthesized starting
points greatly improve query efficiency, especially in the
early stages of the attack. Simply replacing the initializa-
tion method reduces the median number of queries from
5485 to 1541, which is a reduction by 72%. Interestingly,
some of the starting points synthesized by our method are
already below the `2 threshold (such as the snake in Figure
1, which was obtained in a single query).
We perform another run with modified hyperparameters
to take better advantage of our starting points (exact values
are provided in our source code). This run achieves a me-
dian of 1028 queries, which in total amounts to a reduction
by 81% and, to the best of our knowledge, significantly out-
performs the previous state of the art in targeted black-box
attacks. Figure 3 shows a side-by-side comparison of attack
progress for a single example.
5. Conclusion
We have shown that the performance of iterative black-
box attacks greatly depends on their initialization. In a
proof of concept, we have demonstrated how starting points
can be synthesized by adding small patches to an image.
Indeed, some of the images crafted by our method could be
considered adversarial from the start, rendering the actual
attack largely obsolete.
This seems to indicate that the limits of current bench-
marks for evaluating black-box attacks are being reached,
and that subsequent improvements might not add to their
applicability in the real world. A better definition of ”adver-
sarial” is needed, and metrics such as `2 (and, for that mat-
ter, `∞) should be replaced by measures based on human
cognition. On high-resolution images, robustness should
not be benchmarked by performing top-1 classification –
an image that visibly contains both a car and a dog (Figure
1) should not be considered adversarial. Future benchmarks
could address this problem by including multi-object detec-
tion, or at least top-k classification.
Still, our discovery provides some pointers for future
work on real-world attacks. For example, an attacker may
wish to create an adversarial patch as suggested by Brown
et al. [3], and then use an iterative attack to camouflage it
in the environment. It should also be interesting to see if
adaptive attacks like the Boundary Attack can be modified
to maintain a certain distance from the decision boundary,
which would make the resulting examples robust in noisy
scenarios and against non-deterministic classifiers. We con-
sider this a prerequisite for finally bringing this family of
attacks to the real world.
Our work shows that it is much easier to create black-
box adversarial examples for high-resolution image classi-
fiers than previously thought, and we hope this discovery
provides a stepping stone towards a more realistic evalua-
tion of black-box attacks in the future.
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